这无害于存在

这篇文章挺难找,因为纽约版和香港版标题不同,
今天值得一读的文章的不少,连陈总结水扁也找枪手出来表文章了,
想想还是麦金农的文章应该留存下来,他的观点很合中国政府的口味,
文中的几个points可以留意,其一认为贸易问题是着眼两国迥异的储蓄率造成的,
其二认为人民币贬值会造成紧缩减少出口,未必能改善贸易不平衡
翻来老麦两年前在复旦的演讲,观点没有多少改变.

另一篇文章也很有意思,未属名算了社论兮兮的东西,大意是
中国政府认为稳定的经济发展是其执政中国的合法性基础的保证;
作者指出经济的繁荣已经并且继续促生大量中产阶级,推动中国的政治体制改革.
这篇文章有趣在字里行间似乎戴着一副对中国成长颇为忧虑的有色眼镜
(文中指出中国政府在国际舞台仍不够负责,当然是以美国人的观点,如与苏丹和北韩的关系)
但结论却是希望中国的经济稳定成长,继续繁荣,民主方有希望~~十分可爱啊
The Long View [Editorial and Outlook, WSJ Asian April 20, 2006]

陈总统就不说了,总统出来在报纸上喊冤骂娘,总不是很体面的事.
记得费正清的话--长远来看,只有中美关系问题,没有台湾问题

http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/china/index.html

China is Not a Currency Manipulator
[Asian Version: Saving the Yuan]
WSJ Editorials & Opinion. April 20, 2006

By Ronald I. McKinnon

McKinnon: "China is Not a Currency Manipulator"
Ronald McKinnon of Stanford argues that China's fixed exchange rate is intended to maintain internal macroeconomic stability, it is not an attempt to tip the trading scales unfairly in its direction through mercantilist type policy. He argues that "China is not a currency manipulator and the yuan/dollar rate is best left more or less where it is":

Currency Manipulator? By Ronald McKinnon, Commentary, WSJ: China's president, Hu Jintao, on his first visit to the U.S., may well puzzle over his host's government's sometimes ... legalistic approach to international economic issues. Section 3004 of Public Law 100-418 requires that the secretary of the Treasury assess whether countries such as China ... are manipulating their exchange rates to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage...

The question of whether the beleaguered treasury secretary, John Snow, is willing to classify China as a "currency manipulator," with unspecified economic sanctions to follow ... is the current serious flashpoint in China-U.S. relations. Unfortunately, U.S. lawmakers and many, if not most, economists fail to understand that China's motivation for pegging its exchange has been to secure internal monetary stability and not to achieve an undue mercantile advantage in world export markets. The law as written mistakenly presumes that current account surpluses are per se evidence of currency manipulation...

Without a doubt, China's trade surpluses are large and possibly getting larger. ... But since [2004], the collective trade surpluses of the oil-exporting countries have become larger than China's surplus. The key difference, however, is that China is a major exporter of manufactured goods that sometimes compete with U.S. manufactures, whereas imports of oil and natural gas are viewed as vital inputs for American industry. This ... explains the current concern in the Congress with possible "unfair" competition from China but not from oil exporters despite their proportionately larger surpluses. ...

Section 3004 fails to recognize that persistent trade surpluses in China and trade deficits in the U.S. reflect very high saving in China and unusually low saving the U.S., an imbalance that no exchange rate change can correct. ... The result is that China (like many other countries in Asia) naturally runs an overall current account surplus...

This large current account deficit ... reflects borrowing from the rest of the world to cover its saving deficiency. Without this saving transfer allowing the U.S. to spend more on goods and services than it produces, the U.S. would suffer a credit crunch. Interest rates would increase so that investment ... would fall. If this cessation of net foreign lending to the U.S. happened suddenly causing the current account deficit to fall quickly, and if there was no correction in America's saving deficiency, the U.S. economy would be forced into a sharp cyclical downturn similar to the "credit crunch" of 1991-92. ...

Two main points must be recognized. First, an exchange rate change cannot correct America's current account and saving-investment imbalance. Second, if the saving rate in the U.S. were to increase gradually through time, then its current account deficit would gradually diminish -- without requiring any substantial change in nominal dollar exchange rates with major trading partners including China.

Increased U.S. saving must come from two sources: the federal government and the household sector. (U.S. corporate saving from retained profits remains robust.) Strenuous efforts must be made reduce the U.S. federal fiscal deficit.. Tax revenues have fallen to an unduly low level by international standards. Dealing with deficient, perhaps negative, household saving is conceptually a much trickier problem. But some program of "forced" saving, from a national pension plan above and beyond Social Security contributions, should be considered...

However, suppose the U.S. current account deficit is misdiagnosed as an exchange rate problem ... More than 20 years ago, when Japan had the largest bilateral trade surplus with the U.S., the U.S. government exerted continual pressure on Japan to appreciate the yen. Indeed, the yen went all the way from 360 to the dollar in 1971 to peak out at just 80 to the dollar in April 1995. This induced a bubble in Japanese stock and land prices in the late 1980s, which collapsed in 1991. A deflationary slump and a zero interest liquidity trap followed resulting in Japan's "lost decade" of the '90s. ...

Could the same thing happen to China? From 1994 through to July 21, 2005, China had fixed its exchange rate ... And this policy was successful in ironing out China's previous "roller coaster ride" in domestic price inflation and growth rates. ... Now China has come under great pressure ... to appreciate the renminbi. Since July 21, 2005, the renminbi has appreciated slowly .... But ... In 2006, China's ... CPI inflation has fallen to just 1%, whereas America's is over 3%. Clearly, any substantial further appreciation will push China into a situation where its CPI begins to fall. To be sure, China's real economy remains robust. But if it is continually forced to appreciate the renminbi ... the possibility of a Japanese-style deflationary slump cannot be ruled out.

So, in an ideal world, on what basis should Presidents Hu and Bush agree to reduce the trade imbalance between the two countries? China needs to increase private consumption in order to reduce its saving glut -- and its new five-year plan ... points in this direction. But the U.S. needs to drastically rein in the federal budget deficit in order to reduce the national saving deficiency. If China keeps its side of the agreement but the U.S. does not, then China's reduced trade surplus ... will mean higher interest rates... China is not a currency manipulator and the yuan/dollar rate is best left more or less where it is.

Mr. McKinnon, a professor of economics at Stanford, is the author of "Exchange Rates under East Asian Dollar Standard: LIving with Conflicted Virtue" (MIT Press, 2005)